
Lecture 38 of 60 · Games and Information
Ankur A. Kulkarni
Games and Information · 60 lectures
60 lectures
1: Overview of the course
2: Definition of a game and Nash equilibrium
3: Examples of Nash equilibrium
4: Domination: Weakly dominated strategies
5: Domination: Strictly dominated strategies
10: Proof of the structural theorem (forward direction)
6: Aumann model of incomplete information
7: Knowledge operator: Definition and Examples
8: Common knowledge: Definition and Examples
9: The structural theorem of common knowledge
11: Proof of the structural theorem (backward direction)
12: Aumann model of incomplete information with belief
13: Aumann’s agreement theorem
14: Zero-sum game definition and Security strategies
15: Saddle point strategies
16: Further properties of saddle point strategies
17: Mixed strategies
18: Weirstrass lemma and existence of a mixed saddle point
19: Von Nuenmann minmax theorem
20: Computing mixed saddle point startegy: Holmes and Moriarty
21: Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X2 matrix game
22: Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X3 matrix game
23: Nash equilibrium of a non zero-sum game and its relation
24: Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 1
25: Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 2
26: Existence of Nash equilibrium for infinite strategy space
27: Quantal Response: Motivation
28: Quantal Response: Formal model
29: Dynamic games definiton
30: Solution concept in dynamic games
31: Relation of the heuristic solution with the Nash
32: Example of a Threat equilibrium
33: Interpreting the threat equilibrium in standard normal
34: Extensive form games I
35: Extensive form games II
36: Single Act Games
37: Informationally inferior games
38: Information Structure in Single Act Games
39: Nested and Ladder Nested Extensive form games
40: Equilibrium Algorithm
41: Stage-wise multi act games
43: Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
44: Conditions for equivalence for mixed and behavioral
45: Kuhn’s Theorem I
46: Kuhn’s Theorem II
47: Kuhn’s Theorem III
48: Games of incomplete information
49: Bayesian Nash equilibrium I
50: Bayesian Nash equilibrium II
51: Self-enforcement of Nash equilibrium
52: Stackelberg game
53: Principal-Agent Models I
54: Principal-Agent Models II
55: Moral Hazard and Adverse selection
56: Games with contracts
57: Correlated Equilibrium I
58: Correlated Equilibrium II
59: Correlated Equilibrium III
60: Bayesian Game with mediated communication
61: Revelation Principle