
Lecture 21 of 24 · Game Theory
Ben Polak
Game Theory · 24 lectures
24 lectures
1: Introduction: five first lessons
2: Putting yourselves into other people’s shoes
3: Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
4: Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
5: Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
6: Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
7: Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
8: Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
9: Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
10: Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
11: Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation
12: Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression
13: Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
14: Backward induction: commitment, spies
15: Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
16: Backward induction: reputation and duels
17: Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
18: Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game
19: Subgame perfect equilibrium
20: Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
21: Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
22: Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
23: Asymmetric information: silence
24: Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner’s curse